1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
3	WESTERN DIVISION
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5	ERIC L. JEFFRIES, : CIVIL ACTION 1:02cv351
6	: Cincinnati, Ohio
7	Plaintiff, : Friday, October 8, 2004 :
8	-vs- :
9	CENTRE LIFE INSURANCE CO., : Conference in chambers et al., :
10	Defendant. : 9:00 a.m.
11	
12	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
13	BEFORE THE HONORABLE SANDRA S. BECKWITH, CHIEF JUDGE
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15	For the Plaintiff: Michael A. Roberts, Esq. Graydon, Head & Ritchey LLP
16	Fifth Third Center, Suite 1900 Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
17	For the Defendant: William R. Ellis. Esq.
18	Amy G. Callow, Esq.
19	Wood & Lamping 600 Vine Street, Suite 2500
20	Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
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22	Law Clerk: Pat Smith Court Reporter: Betty Schwab
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## 1 PROCEEDINGS IN CHAMBERS THE COURT: Well, I read what each of you have 2 submitted. I looked at the highlighted portions of the 3 proposed mutual settlement and general release agreement. 4 Most of the highlighted portions and, in fact all, as I 5 recall, have to do with the assumptive reinsurance 6 agreement and the tax consequences and not with the 7 confidentiality issue. Am I correct? 8 9 MR. ROBERTS: With the exception of what's highlighted at pages 12 and 13, or at least they should 10 11 have been highlighted. 12 THE COURT: Oh, in green. Yes, yes. Sorry. 13 MR. ROBERTS: Which is all a section. 14 THE COURT: Basically that was all stricken. So 15 that left the agreement with nothing regarding 16 confidentiality. Am I right? 17 MR. ELLIS: Correct, Your Honor. 18 MR. ROBERTS: That's what the defendants' 19 proposal is. 20 THE COURT: All right. Let me tell you what I 21 understand the problems to be, and then you can fill in the blanks or correct me. We put a settlement on the record 22 April 19th this year. As I recall, there was an agreement 23 with regard to the tax consequences that Mr. Roberts could 24 25 work directly with Mr. Cohen to attempt to avoid the

payment of taxes on the income generated by the two million 1 dollar settlement, and they reached an agreement regarding 2 the assumptive reinsurance situation. Apparently, there is 3 a fair amount of discussion between Mr. Cohen and 4 Mr. Roberts, and perhaps Mr. Ellis as well, off the record 5 outside the presence of the Court on the particulars of how 6 7 that agreement was going to work. 8 MR. ROBERTS: Time frame? Prior to? 9 THE COURT: It was not entirely clear to me, but 10 it seems there was discussion of that. 11 MR. ROBERTS: Yes. 12 THE COURT: Privately, not in the course of our 13 settlement discussions. 14 MR. ROBERTS: Both before and after, right. 15 MR. ELLIS: I may be able to save the Court some time on this, Your Honor, with regard to the tax issues. 16 17 spoke with Mr. Cohen yesterday. He, as Mike had suggested, 18 spoke directly with the financial advisor that has been 19 employed, and they are of one mind, and she is currently 20 working it out. As a matter of fact, he was waiting to hear from her today or soon on some language, because they 21 now understand what we can and cannot do with regard to the 22 23 agreement. 24 The problem wasn't the attempt to assist the 25 Jeffries in having it tax free. The problem was that the

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language that was used was stating things that DMS could not state with any kind of certainty whatsoever. And Mr. Cohen and the financial advisor, according to what he told me just yesterday, have come to the conclusion that there is language that is acceptable to both parties that will resolve the problem. So I don't think the tax issue is a major problem. MR. ROBERTS: I don't know that Bill's correct. I did get an e-mail from my expert, who is now dialoguing with Mr. Cohen, and the e-mail to me said that she had spoken to him and she is going to come back with a proposal. So, whether there is one mind or agreement on the tax language, I hope we're there, but right now we're still in the proposal stage. But, like I said, I'm hopeful that the subject that those two discussed will result in that issue being resolved. And perhaps we just reserve that in the event it's not. MR. ELLIS: I believe that one is going to be taken care of. THE COURT: Okay. Well, it was concerning to me that, at some point, I think it was Mr. Ellis that said please don't contact Mr. Cohen directly any longer; deal And I thought that probably is not a practical solution to the problem, because it seemed to me that most

of the language that was stricken, and maybe I'm

misinterpreting, was stricken by Mr. Cohen, and, if you 1 couldn't contact him directly to ask him the reasons for 2 doing that, you couldn't very easily work out the problem. 3 MR. ROBERTS: You know, there was a reference in 4 Mr. Ellis' letter to you last week, Your Honor, that 5 suggested perhaps I had spoken to Mr. Cohen without the 6 authority to do so and improperly. That never occurred. 7 Ι was invited to speak to him before our trial on Sunday 8 evening. I did so. I was invited to speak with him post 9 trial in settlement. I did so. I had phone calls with 10 I had e-mail conversations with him. The voice mail 11 message he left for me, I believe, is in my declaration. 12 want to be clear that there is not the suggestion I spoke 13 14 to him without the authority to do so. 15 My understanding was that there may THE COURT: have been some change of heart about whether you should be 16 in contact with him directly, and it didn't seem to me that 17 18 that was going to help us out very much. 19 Do I understand that direct contact is not a 20 problem? 21 The direct contact between counsel MR. ELLIS: and Mr. Cohen I don't think is a problem. Mr. Cohen 22 requested that the rest of the language be worked out between the two of us. He had said this is what I cannot Then Mike and I talked, and we agreed that the

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simplest way to do this was to have the financial advisor 1 who was telling Mike, who was then putting language in, to 2 talk directly with Mr. Cohen, who was taking language out 3 and telling me. So we just cut out the middleman and let 4 5 the two of them work it out. 6 MR. ROBERTS: So Mr. Cohen is involved, but with a different representative from Mr. Jeffries. 7 8 THE COURT: Well, there is always the potential, when you have too many people passing on messages -- it's 9 like the old party game -- that the message ends up 10 11 qarbled. 12 MR. ELLIS: We now have it worked out. 13 THE COURT: Okay. So resolution of the 14 tax-related language in the settlement is in progress, in 15 process? 16 MR. ELLIS: Hopefully. 17 THE COURT: Okay. Then the other remaining issue 18 is the confidentiality situation. 19 MR. ROBERTS: I would say yes, but, depending on where that comes out, there might be an issue with regard 20 21 to the release, Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: Well, can we talk about -- should we talk about them separately, or are they so interrelated 23 24 that we can't separate them? 25 MR. ELLIS: I don't know what the other issue is

1 with regard to the release. 2 THE COURT: I don't either. 3 MR. ROBERTS: I think that, if we deal with the 4 confidentiality issue first, that that may or may not take 5 care of the release. 6 THE COURT: As I understand what Plaintiff's 7 position is, and Plaintiff has submitted information that 8 seems to support his position, that the terms of the 9 confidentiality provision to be included in the settlement 10 agreement was reserved to the plaintiff. 11 MR. ROBERTS: It was. And if I could highlight 12 exactly how we got to that position again, there were 13 settlement discussions that were conducted with the Court's 14 assistance during the week or ten days prior to the 15 scheduled trial date of April 19th, and they weren't 16 successful. But on Sunday, April 18th, at 8:30 in the 17 evening I was invited to call Mr. Cohen. And he and I 18 spoke, and we resolved -- I thought we had resolved an 19 issue about tax ability that was concerning to 20 Mr. Jeffries. 21 We also discussed confidence, and we agreed that 22 it would be at Mr. Jeffries' election if we settled, but we 23 hadn't settled that evening. The next day, we proceeded to 24 trial, and, in the course of the proceedings the next day, 25 during the lunch hour the parties did reach an agreement.

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And when we articulated our agreement to the Court, we returned to the Court at about 2 p.m., and the transcript of that afternoon began with the Court asking that, on behalf of the plaintiff, I recite what the settlement terms were. And at page two of the transcript from that day, I say: Thank you, Your Honor. Prior to the trial, the defendant offered to pay to the plaintiff two million in exchange for return of the disability policy, the return of confidential documents, and left to the plaintiff an election on confidentiality provisions relating to the case and the settlement. And there are further terms that go on, but then at page four the Court invited Defendants' counsel, Mr. Ellis, to state whether I had accurately reflected the terms. And Mr. Ellis says: Your Honor, the offer that was made accurately stated, to the extent I thought we were asked, to provide half up front. And he talks about payment of cash. But nonetheless, he affirms that I accurately represented that the parties' agreement was that confidence is at Mr. Jeffries' election.

The Court then, somewhat perhaps quizzical as to the confidentiality provision, at page six says, quote: And the confidentiality is at the option of the plaintiff; is that correct? And I respond yes. And Mr. Ellis'

response was, quote: It's not an issue for us, Your Honor.

There were several other references to confidentiality throughout the transcript that I have highlighted that I provided to the Court. At the bottom of page six and top of page seven, Mr. Ellis says, quote: It makes no difference to us. We will, of course, ask for the information Mr. Roberts found concerning it be sealed, the same with Mr. Jeffries. No problem.

Later I, through Mary Brown, the Court's assistant, asked that the case be sealed, and Mr. Ellis objected to that. So, as of today, the record 02-351 is not sealed. All the documents remain public record.

Later in the course of that hearing at page 22, Mr. Ellis said, line 23: I think what we can do is this: Today we will agree to confidentiality of all materials related to Mr. Jeffries' claim, and it will not be surrendered without an order of the Court. And Mr. Roberts will receive notice if anyone suggests they're going to seek it by subpoena or court order, and we will leave it at that today.

I have not received any communication from Mr. Ellis that anyone has sought that information from his office or his client, and I have not been advised by Mr. Ellis that they've willingly given any information to anyone, but we suspect perhaps an inquiry on that line is

appropriate.

At line 25 or -- excuse me -- page 25, line 13 of that transcript from April 19th, Mr. Ellis says: I don't know what the concern is of the plaintiff, but I will guarantee you this stuff is not going anywhere. So we had Mr. Ellis' guarantee on behalf of the plaintiff as of April 19th that, from that moment forward, they were to keep it confidential.

The issue that now arises is Defendant says they never suspected that Mr. Jeffries' election on confidentiality could have been unilateral. They said that was not within the concept of what he perceived Mr. Jeffries' election to be. Well, that's not material. It's like discretion. What they agreed to do, what they said was not an issue for them, was to leave confidence at Mr. Jeffries' election. He could elect that it be mutual. He could elect that it be unilateral. He could elect that it be complete. He could elect that it be partial. He could elect that it apply on Tuesdays if he wanted to and not on Wednesdays. It was his election in his sole discretion to decide what he wanted in the way of confidence, and that understanding is patent from how the proceeding concluded.

The proceeding concluded at page 35 with juror number one asking the Court: May we hear the settlement

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The Court's response was at page 35: Mr. Roberts, terms? how does your client feel about it? And I said my client would allow the jury to know. What does that say? Mr. Ellis was in the courtroom. The Court did not ask Mr. Ellis for his consent. It was obvious to the Court and obvious by Mr. Ellis' failure to object that it was for Mr. Jeffries to decide which, if any, third parties could know of the settlement terms. The jurors were third parties. The Court said: Mr. Jeffries, can they know or can they not know? It's up to you. It's his election. That was the understanding. These are third parties that came to know the terms of the settlement only because Mr. Jeffries desired that they know. It wasn't a mutual consent. It was completely up to him. Articulating the terms of the settlement to the jury did not prevent Mr. Jeffries from asking for confidence from anyone at any point in time. It was his election. He decided that they could know. He can also decide that other people can or can't know. It was his election. They didn't object. What transpired after we left that day was drafts of the settlement agreements were exchanged. I proposed a settlement agreement that said Mr. Jeffries is going to keep it confidential to the extent he desires, but he requires that the defendants and all their agents and the

lawyers keep it confidential. And the defendant says they're not going to agree to that now.

It's exactly in contradiction with what happened on April 19th, what they committed to on April 19th.

What's obvious from expressing the settlement terms to the third-party jury was that it was Mr. Jeffries' decision and his decision alone, and Defendants would just have to live with it. And if Mr. Jeffries requires that they keep it confidential, that's what they have to live with. That's what they agreed to.

That was the term that was promised in exchange for releasing the jury, and now they won't agree to it.

Mr. Ellis will say: Well, Mr. Roberts, not Mr. Jeffries,

Mr. Roberts breached the confidentiality agreement because he provided information about the Jeffries case to another client, Mr. Kearney.

I don't know if the Court is aware, but I also represent another individual who's been sued by DMS. DMS is third-party administrator for another insurance company called Jefferson Pilot. There wasn't a lot of discovery in that case before Jeffries concluded, but I had been retained by that individual before Jeffries concluded. During the process of representing that individual, I shared information that I came to know about DMS.

Subsequent to April 19th, I've continued to discuss with

that individual information about DMS. I have not revealed to that individual anything confidential.

The Court may or may not be mindful, but in the Jeffries case, which was initiated in May of 2002, there was no suggestion of a protective order until March of 2004, almost two years. And the protective order was very discreet. It applied to personnel files and other information that had to be marked "confidential." Nobody has seen those confidential materials. Those were all returned to Mr. Ellis. Mr. Kearney has not seen those. They have not been provided.

But, nonetheless, it's a nonissue because, if Mr. Jeffries decides that Mr. Kearney can know about his case, it's his election, just like the jury. Mr. Kearney is no different than the jury. He's a third party that Mr. Jeffries could choose to share that information with.

Mr. Ellis makes a representation in his letter of September 30th that some lawyer in Arizona has gotten information about the Jeffries case. That's true. I contacted that lawyer after Mr. Ellis made that representation. His name is Charles Surano. And I sent him an e-mail, and I talked to him on the phone. I said, what have you learned. Apparently, Mr. Kearney has sent that lawyer, Charles Surano, some deposition transcripts.

I have, if the Court desires to review it, an

e-mail from Cathy Smith, who is Mr. Surano's assistant.
Mr. Surano, because the procedure rules in Arizona require
it, disclosed to DMS in a case called Phillips v. Mass

Casualty Insurance Company, the same defendant as here,
disclosed the sixth supplemental disclosure of the
plaintiff in June of 2004. And in that disclosure on
behalf of Mr. Phillips, Attorney Surano reveals that he's
gotten some depositions from a lawyer in a case called

Gralnek v. Mass Casualty, a case called Perry v. Mass

Casualty, a case called Novak v. Mass Casualty and a case
called Odom v. Mass Casualty. This lawyer in Arizona has
gone to great lengths to speak to lawyers who have gone up
against DMS and Mass Casualty, including speaking
apparently to Mr. Kearney.

According to this disclosure, Mr. Kearney or someone other than me provided this lawyer with the deposition transcripts of John Graff, Andy Cohen and Jeff Champagne. Those deposition transcripts were filed in the public record in this case. The depositions in whole and many parts of them were cited in briefs and attached as attachments to the briefs.

There is nothing confidential, nothing confidential, about those deposition transcripts. They're not subject to any stipulated protective order. They're not marked confidential according to my protective order.

They are part of the public record. There is no breach of any confidence because some lawyer in Arizona, who is doing his job contacting plaintiffs throughout the country, comes up with this public record of a deposition transcript. You don't even get there, because it doesn't matter. It was Mr. Jeffries' election about who could and who couldn't learn information about his case.

Maybe even more important than that is in May of this year I made efforts through the Court's assistant Mary Brown to have the record sealed, and Mr. Ellis objected. So that record remains public because Mr. Ellis objected to having it sealed. So it's a public record. There is --

I submit, Your Honor, it is not logical, because, within the past couple weeks, I have told Mr. Ellis: Hey, you know, if you want to talk about a confidentiality arrangement, we could possibly, you and I, talk about something that could be mutual that would meet whatever your client's interests are. He flatly rejected my offer to speak, and he did that because, he says, "you breached it."

Well, I haven't breached it, and it doesn't make sense to me that, if I offer to get together and enter some mutual confidential arrangement, that they wouldn't take me up on that, unless the only thing I can come up with to explain the position that they present to you today, Your

Honor, the only thing I can come up with is that they haven't kept it confidential. And if they haven't kept it confidential, that would explain why it is they don't want to be bound by any confidential right now. That is what makes the release an issue, because they guaranteed, his own word, "guarantee you we'll keep it confidential" on April 19th.

If he hasn't kept it or his clients haven't kept it confidential since April 19th, then there is a real concern about a legal claim. Mr. Jeffries and I have reason to believe that a third party has come to know information about the case through Mr. Ellis or his clients that may be causing Mr. Jeffries damage, any claim that may exist presently for a breach of that guarantee.

I would ask that the Court inquire of Mr. Ellis about what disclosures he's made since April 19th.

THE COURT: Mr. Ellis?

MR. ELLIS: Your Honor, I don't think it was ever contemplated that the confidentiality that we left to plaintiffs' election could be partial, selective or unilateral. None of those makes any sense for my clients, obviously. The concern that we have for the unilateral confidentiality is very simple. As Mr. Roberts has evidenced in depositions in Mr. Kearney's case, he will use the information in the Jeffries case offensively, spin it

how he will in his prosecution of other cases. He's also, or someone has, through Mr. Roberts, disseminated this information to other plaintiffs' lawyers around the country. So we're going to be faced with the information that was developed in the Jeffries case and the outcome of the Jeffries case and so forth with the spin of the particular plaintiff's attorney who has it.

Under the confidentiality agreement as proposed unilaterally, Plaintiffs can spin it and do whatever they wish with it, and our only response can be it's confidential. If we do that, then the Courts involved in those cases get a significant misimpression about what happened here, and they get a significant misimpression about what DMS or its other insurers, insurers for whom it works, can say what has happened in the past.

We had the experience in the transcripts in the Kearney case. I brought for you some examples of what kind of things we're dealing with. It's true we agreed not to seal or we objected to sealing the case, which was, by the way, just days before this deposition that that motion was made, saying we would be glad to seal it once we had the agreement completed and the confidentiality worked out. The Court agreed with us on that and did not seal the case for that purpose.

If you look at the first deposition transcript,

Exhibit 1 or page 100 and 101, which was the deposition of Valerie Loftin, it's the second and third page that I have given you, Mr. Roberts in his question is asking her if she's mindful of a jury in Ohio concluding that DMS acted in bad faith.

Well, now, if we can't respond and say that was a summary jury trial and actually it was settlement technique as opposed to an actual trial, and we can only say it's confidential, there is no dispute that what Mr. Roberts couches as a jury verdict was, in fact, the case.

In Todd Ditmar's deposition, page 16 and 17, we had the same situation where he refers to a jury determination in Hamilton County that DMS has acted in bad faith. Further, on page eight, he discloses the jury verdict -- I'm sorry -- page eight in a discussion with me, he refers to the jury verdict of bad faith again and to the settlement itself.

THE COURT: Are you talking about the Ditmar deposition?

MR. ELLIS: Yes. This is Mr. Ditmar at page eight and nine. Page six, which probably should have preceded those, is my objection to Mr. Roberts' use of material from the Jeffries case. He told me he had already given it to Mr. Kearney and therefore it's a public document, and so he's not bound by it, although it was he

using it in the deposition.

Page 65, he marked Exhibit 30. Exhibit 30 contained documents from the Jeffries case, specifically personnel records identified as DMS 47, 48 and 49 from the Jeffries case. If the Court will skip back just a few pages, you will see that a motion was made to seal what was then called Exhibit 3, which was DMS pages 47 to 53, including the pages that were used in this deposition.

MR. ROBERTS: Where are you reading from?

MR. ELLIS: There would be a motion to seal Exhibit 3, which is a couple -- which is at the end of the transcripts. That generated a Court order which immediately follows in which Judge Hogan, under the heading "Defendants' Motion to Seal Exhibit 3," said Defendants' motion placing Exhibit 3 under seal is unopposed and hereby granted. The exhibit contains information from the personnel file of one of the defendant's employees. The Court finds such information to be protected from public query and Plaintiff's failure to take issue with this fact is sensible.

Further, two pages later in that order on follow-up performance evaluations, the Court says that the only way to get to the truth is to order the disclosure of redacted -- of the redacted material made in these cases and that that would be subject to a protective order, which

is what the Court said. Further on the next page, the next order stipulated protected order pursuant to Magistrate Hogan's March 23rd order, item two, this order applies to the financial information referenced in March 3, '04 order, the administrative services agreement and previously redacted performance evaluations, all of which Mr. Roberts used in the Kearney case.

My client has no belief at this point that there ever was an intention on the part of Mr. Jeffries or his counsel to keep anything confidential, and we know that it has spread around the country already.

Mutual confidentiality makes no sense to anybody. It was never contemplated by me. It was never contemplated, and, if we did not have a meeting of the minds, we did not have a meeting of the minds, and then Mr. Jeffries would have the option of saying we did not settle the case, at which case we can put it back on the trial calendar.

My client can't take the untenable position of not being able to respond to the information from the Jeffries case being spun whichever way Mr. Roberts or some other plaintiff's attorney wishes to spin it without being able to respond to it other than saying it's confidential. There was no mention in that entire transcript before the court settlement of unilateral confidentiality. That word

doesn't appear anywhere in the transcript, and I have read it four times.

In fact, if the Court looks at that transcript, and specifically at pages six and seven, which was partially suggested by counsel, it's apparent that, when he asked that all of the information in the case be sealed, that I was saying it makes no difference to us of course, expecting that all of the information that he has would also be sealed. It showed that I asked for it to be mutual. Likewise, throughout, I have said I would keep it confidential, and we were assuming at the time that that was a request for mutual confidentiality.

The only one who was raising the issue of keeping it confidential was Mr. Roberts, but I never believed for a moment that he expected my client to sit dumbly by while he spreads information around the country to other plaintiff's lawyers and then gags our ability to respond to it. So we can't agree with unilateral confidentiality.

has the same effect as unilateral, because the information has already been spread by Mr. Roberts and his other clients to various and sundry people around the country. So there is no advantage; in fact, there is a significant disadvantage to gagging my client in its response to the way this information is being used in other cases. And

1 that's our concern with regard to confidentiality. 2 MR. ROBERTS: Your Honor, may I have a brief 3 reply? 4 THE COURT: Um-um. MR. ROBERTS: Mr. Ellis' 90-second overview of 5 6 what he suggests was improper disclosures by me in Kearney 7 depositions is baseless. Following those depositions -- we 8 were here before you at the trial on April 19th. Those depositions occurred May 14th. Following those 9 depositions, in June of this year Mr. Ellis filed a motion 10 11 with Magistrate Judge Hogan, who happens to be the 12 magistrate on the Kearney case; he was the magistrate on 13 this case. Judge Hogan was very mindful of the discovery issues in the Jeffries case. Mr. Ellis filed a motion 14 15 asking that Judge Hogan or Judge Spiegel sanction me personally for having breached some confidentiality 16 17 arrangement in the Jeffries case by using this same 18 information that he's highlighted to you. Judge Hogan 19 resolved that motion by finding that Mr. Ellis' allegations 20 were, quote, baseless, and he sanctioned Mr. Ellis for even 21 suggesting that what I did in Kearney violated anything 22 that was protected in Jeffries. 23 So I could respond in detail to defend what he 24 asserts as improper conduct in Kearney. It's baseless. 25 essentially comes down to this. Like I said, there was no

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suggestion of a protective order of confidentiality in Jeffries until March of 2004. Months prior to that, I had been retained by Kearney, and I was providing Kearney with nonprotected information. In August of 2003, eight months before there was any suggestion of confidentiality, in August of 2003 I received a letter from Mr. Ellis, which is Exhibit 31 in the Jeffries -- in the Kearney transcript. He referenced Exhibit 30. Exhibit 31 is his cover letter to me from August of 2003 saying: Mike, enclosed please find the personnel files that are Bates labled 01 through There was no suggestion of confidence in the cover letter. There was no suggestion of confidence or protective order prior to the cover letter. There was no statement of confidence on these documents. unprotected documents are what I used in Kearney. The allegation, as Judge Hogan has already -he's read motions on it; he's read the set of exhibits; he's gotten more than that 60-second snippet from Mr. Ellis. He concluded that what Mr. Ellis is arguing is, quote, baseless. It's document number 76 in case number 02 - 479.MR. ELLIS: To my knowledge, I have not been sanctioned for filing any frivolous motion. Also to my knowledge, at Mr. Roberts' request, his counsel and my counsel spoke with Judge Beckwith -- I'm sorry -- with

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Magistrate Judge Hogan concerning the issues that were raised in that. I had offered and continue to offer to have that entire record reviewed by an independent member of either the judiciary or the ethics committee to determine whether or not things broke. My understanding also is that, at Mr. Roberts' request, that particular order has been stricken or is to be stricken. THE COURT: Document number 76? MR. ELLIS: Document 76. MR. ROBERTS: It was a recommendation that Mr. Ellis and I each be sanctioned, and Judge Hogan has stated that he intends to withdraw that, but he hasn't. But my point is the same. I mean, that doesn't affect the point. My point is Mr. Ellis made this argument to Judge Hogan, who reviewed it and said, Bill, that's baseless, and I'm going to sanction you for even suggesting it. That's the point. Has Mr. Ellis been sanctioned as we sit here today? No. Judge Hogan was persuaded that, largely because of efforts I made to smooth the waters with Mr. Ellis, that it should be stricken, and he hasn't to date, but my understanding is he intends to. I hope he does. MR. ELLIS: Regardless, Your Honor, I don't know how the Court can ignore the specific sealing of the

1 specific exhibit that was used in the deposition still 2 bearing the same Bates numbers identified in the motion 3 sealed by the Court. 4 I don't want to get into the issues that we had 5 in front of Judge Hogan. I can only tell the Court that, with regard to confidentiality, the fact that information 6 7 from the Jeffries case has spread throughout the country 8 and among plaintiffs' lawyers and is being used 9 aggressively by them and by Mr. Roberts in other cases 10 offers no basis or no reason for us to even consider 11 maintaining any confidentiality. If we are going to have to respond, we're going to respond in full to these various 12 13 allegations so that other courts don't get a misimpression about what occurred in the Jeffries case. 14 15 MR. ROBERTS: But it's a public record. As we 16 sit here today, it's as public as today's Cincinnati 17 Enquirer --18 MR. ELLIS: And it will stay there. 19 MR. ROBERTS: -- because I asked that the 02-351 20 record be sealed and Mr. Ellis refused to consent to that. 21 So the three depositions that are now in the possession of 22 some lawyer in Arizona are as public as any document that 23 exists. 24 THE COURT: All right. I buy that. As far as 25 I'm concerned, the only issue in play now is personnel

1 records that were used in the deposition in the Kearney 2 case that were under seal, as I understand it. 3 MR. ROBERTS: That's not the case. There was one 4 personnel file that was asked to be put under seal in the 5 Jeffries case, and it was. It is under seal apparently in 6 the Jeffries case. THE COURT: And it was not used in any other 7 deposition? 8 9 MR. ROBERTS: It was used in Kearney. 10 THE COURT: Okay. 11 MR. ROBERTS: I mean, it was under seal in the 12 Jeffries case, and Judge Hogan drew a line there. There 13 was no overriding protective order that that couldn't be 14 used. It was placed under seal in the Jeffries case. 15 and the other personnel files that were never marked 16 confidential, were never subject to a protective order, 17 were used in Kearney. 18 I have offered, and this is what I offered as 19 soon as Mr. Ellis objected, when he called Judge Hogan 20 during the middle of the deposition, I said, Judge, I'm 21 happy to redact any names, any identifying information from 22 these as exhibits to this deposition transcript. 23 When I offered them as a deposition exhibit, I didn't think there was a problem, because I had had them 24 25 for eight months. I had shared them with Mr. Kearney

1 months before there was any request that they be held confidential or put under seal. Months. 2 They were in my 3 possession and I shared them with my client. 4 offered them in the deposition, a phone call was made to Judge Hogan five minutes later. I said, Judge, we will 5 redact any identifying information from these. 6 7 That issue has been briefed extensively, and 8 Judge Hogan's conclusion, which I agree with, is that the 9 allegation I did anything improper is baseless. 10 THE COURT: Those items are now under a protective order or under seal in the Kearney case? 11 12 MR. ELLIS: No. We requested that the Court --13 let me think about that. I don't remember whether we 14 requested the Court strike them or put them under seal or 15 not, because, frankly, they're out in the public, and 16 plaintiffs' lawyers around the country have been given 17 them. 18 MR. ROBERTS: I have not given them to anybody. 19 THE COURT: I thought you had indicated that you 20 had filed a motion subsequent to the depo. 21 MR. ELLIS: We had, Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: Motion to place Exhibit 3 under seal. 23 MR. ELLIS: That was in the Jeffries case, Your 24 Honor. That's this one. That was the one that resulted in 25 an order sealing it before it was used. Also, there is a

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second order which refers to the previously redacted personnel records, because, as Judge Hogan said, personnel records are not to be put out in the public. They are out in the public, and they're being

used by Mr. Roberts, and I expect we'll see them in other cases as well.

MR. ROBERTS: So the record is clear, the previously redacted -- the reason why I got two sets of personnel files is because one was so redacted that it didn't make such sense. So I went to the Court and said, Judge, I got some redacted personnel files. There was no agreement about what could be redacted. There was no statement about what would be redacted. I don't know what's been redacted. I need them produced again. Mr. Ellis went to the Court and said, well, I will produce them again in unredacted form, but those unredacted forms need to be subject to protective order. And they were. was the unredacted personnel files that were subject to the protective order. The redacted ones, which I had for eight months without any request for confidence and which I shared with my other client, were never subject to any protective order.

THE COURT: Okay. Seems to me the fair and simple solution is that the settlement agreement should contain the language proposed by the plaintiff with

1 additional language that would permit the Court to allow 2 the disclosure of otherwise confidential information in 3 response to information that the plaintiff's counsel might 4 use in other cases. 5 If you choose to open the door, then defense should be allowed, or it's actually the reverse in the 6 7 other case right now, should be able to respond with any 8 information that would otherwise be confidential. And it would have to be done in good faith of course. 9 10 MR. ROBERTS: I think that concept is already 11 within the agreement. I mean, their obligation of 12 confidence is absolutely absolute absent process, subpoena, 13 something like that, as every confidentiality agreement 14 contains. 15 So, you know, I meant to say this earlier, but 16 Bill's major argument is, gee, Mike Roberts and his client 17 and other plaintiffs around the country can talk about the 18 Jeffries case and we have to stay mum. That's not true, 19 because process can open the door for Defendant to say, and 20 that's contained in the agreement. So that concern really 21 is hollow. 22 But so it's consistent with what you're saying, 23 but I suggest it's already contemplated. 24 The problem exists, Your Honor, because there is,

I believe, a third party out there that's not issued any

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1 subpoena to Mr. Ellis or his clients who, I believe, has 2 been educated by Mr. Ellis or his clients since April. THE COURT: Mr. Ellis, has any of the information 3 4 that you said you would hold confidential been shared with third parties? 5 6 MR. ELLIS: No ma'am, not a single document. MR. ROBERTS: What about just conversations? 7 MR. ELLIS: Not a single word about the 8 settlement, its amount, other than that there was a 9 10 confidential settlement, and that was in response to a call 11 from Prudential's counsel who told me that Mike Roberts had 12 called him and said he had some significant success against 13 And he wanted to know the details, and I didn't give 14 them to him. So Mr. Roberts had spoken with him and 15 prompted his phone call to me. I have not provided him 16 with anything, nor have I received a subpoena from him. 17 However, Your Honor, in keeping that good faith 18 from April 19th, we were unaware and remained unaware, 19 until the use of the materials in the Kearney case, that 20 Mr. Roberts had an unspoken idea of unilateral 21 confidentiality to which DMS cannot and will not agree. Ιf 22 there was not a meeting of the minds in the settlement agreement, so be it. If that is a deal breaker and we have 23 24 to try this case, so be it. 25 As to the language that's provided by Mr. Roberts

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in his desired confidentiality agreement, if the Court reads it, it requires me to surrender my litigation file to That I will not do without this Court's order and an appeal from this Court's order, because that is my litigation file. It is attorney-client privileged, and I will not turn it over to Mr. Roberts willingly. It also requires experts in our case to sign off on a settlement agreement while requiring no one on his side to do the same. It also requires that all files and all materials developed either in litigation with experts or at DMS be turned over to Mr. Roberts, with the exception of one copy of what DMS deems is appropriate, which is basically all they keep anyway. But I'm not turning over all of the exhibits and everything else or all of the documents and all my communication, electronic and otherwise, with my client to Mr. Roberts, nor is my client going to turn over to Mr. Roberts just because it happens to mention Jeffries. So we're just not willing to do what Mr. Roberts demands and suggests that we somehow agreed to.

If the Court looks at the transcript, you will see that I said: I don't know what, if anything, I can give him until I hear from Mr. Cohen. Mr. Cohen has refused the suggestion that we surrender the videotapes. He said he will not gut a claims file that could be reviewed by a third party, and that's his ruling on it. I

said at the very beginning I didn't know the answer to the question. I think my exact words were I would have to get authority from on high to agree to provide Mr. Jeffries with all this material. I got the opposite answer.

So we can't do what Mr. Roberts has demanded to do, and we have no real desire to enter into a unilateral confidentiality agreement by which material is spread and has been spread. You can't really put the horse back in the barn here on this one. It's out. It's among the plaintiffs' counsel around the country, and we are going to see it time and again, and we are going to respond to it appropriately with the information that we have on this case.

So, you know, if we did not have a meeting of the minds and if I did not understand the unspoken unilateral or selective idea that Mr. Roberts had when he suggested confidentiality, which will be the first time in 30 years of practice I have ever seen confidentiality that wasn't mutual. Confidentiality means keep something quiet; keep it concealed; keep it under wraps. If one party does it and the other doesn't, it's not confidential. It's a contradiction in terms.

THE COURT: Mr. Ellis, by the same token,
Mr. Roberts could argue that your unspoken expectation that
there would either be full mutual confidentiality or no

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      confidentiality is no less --
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                MR. ELLIS: Absolutely correct, Your Honor.
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                THE COURT: -- a problem.
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                MR. ELLIS: So if we didn't have a meeting of the
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      minds, then we don't have an agreement.
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                THE COURT: But what you said in open court is we
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      don't care. It's at the election of the plaintiff.
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                MR. ELLIS: Confidentiality or no
      confidentiality, that's correct.
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                THE COURT: But that isn't what you said.
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                MR. ELLIS: I said confidentiality is at the
     election of the plaintiff. The Court said the same thing.
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     I don't believe that the Court suspected at that time that
     one side would be able to do whatever they wanted with the
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     material and spread it anywhere they wanted and the other
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     side would have to stay mum.
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               MR. ROBERTS: Yes, it did. That's when the jury
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     came in.
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               MR. ELLIS: I'm sorry. I was asking the Court
     what the Court perceived. If the Court perceived that this
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     was unilateral, then I was the only idiot in the room that
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     didn't.
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               MR. ROBERTS: When the jury returned, the jury
     asked the Court can we learn. The Court turned to
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    Mr. Jeffries and asked him and him alone. Now that request
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1 to Mr. Jeffries and his saying, yes, they can learn, didn't mean -- I don't think anybody in the room thought that 2 3 meant everybody in the world can know everything. his election to let this third party know. That was the 4 understanding. 5 6 And the point Mr. Ellis makes about they're not 7 going to give me anything now, that consumed an extra 45 8 minutes on April 19th. What I understood on April 19th 9 what the concern was, we need to keep what we need to keep 10 to keep state regulators happy. So they need one copy. They need to keep -- my understanding going away on April 11 12 19th was they were going to keep one copy of whatever they 13 required to keep state regulators happy; otherwise, 14 everything would be returned to me. 15 I have not received any documents from Mr. Ellis 16 since that day. I have returned to Mr. Ellis all documents 17 he gave me marked confidential. 18 THE COURT: Well, it seemed to me that the authority or, well, I guess authority to determine the 19 20 terms, if any, of any confidentiality agreement were vested in the plaintiff. And the reason I asked the question is it's usually the defendant who says I demand a confidentiality agreement as a part of this settlement. MR. ELLIS: Which is correct.

THE COURT: Which you did not do.

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MR. ELLIS: No, because we didn't particularly care whether it was confidential or not. But we're not going to be -- I don't think we should be placed in a position where we're the only ones that have to keep it confidential. The plaintiff can and has done anything it wants with the material in the file. And if it's a public document, as counsel says, until we reach this agreement, I guess I can distribute anything I want to anybody I care to.

MR. ROBERTS: We settled the deal on April 19th

MR. ROBERTS: We settled the deal on April 19th with your guarantee that it would remain confidential.

That was clear.

MR. ELLIS: That guarantee was contingent upon it being mutual. My understanding was that it was mutual. If I misunderstood you, Mike, I'm sorry, but then we don't have an agreement.

THE COURT: Well, technically, I think that the language here only permits Centre, its counsel, DMS or any expert retained by Centre or its counsel to reveal confidential information in response to a subpoena seeking testimony or documents relating to the Jeffries case.

Obviously, if Centre, its counsel, DMS or any experts retained by Centre or its counsel needed documents from the Jeffries case in order to respond to any information that came out in another case, Mr. Ellis wouldn't be serving the

subpoena on himself. So maybe that's a problem.

But I think, based on the record, that the plaintiff has a perfect right to say I elect unilateral confidentiality or partial confidentiality. I think the defendant makes a valid point that, if the materials that have been deemed to be confidential are legitimately at issue in another case and the defendant would be unfairly disadvantaged by not being able to produce those materials, there should be some safety valve in the settlement agreement.

But to say that, because Plaintiff intends to reserve to himself the right to disclose whatever he chooses in the case and not give the defendant the same option, I think is what you asked for, what you opened the door to. And you say it makes no difference, and it doesn't make any difference as long as you are able to utilize the material to the extent necessary to defend your current or future clients from any otherwise confidential material that has come into Mr. Roberts' hands as a result of this case.

MR. ROBERTS: I've never heard that concern articulated by Mr. Ellis, but I have offered to discuss with him adding terms to this agreement, and he's refused. I think what you're suggesting is appropriate and reasonable, and I think we would agree to it.

MR. ELLIS: Your Honor, this issue is not going to come up only in cases that I have with DMS. It's already coming up in a state court case in Arizona in which DMS is represented by counsel in Arizona. All of DMS's outside counsel will have the same difficulty as they're faced with information that was provided and disseminated from the Jeffries case.

Mr. Roberts kept personnel files confidential or where he kept the information in the case confidential, as I assumed had been done, as we did with the material that we gathered on his client, we would have had no problem of a mutual confidentiality agreement. However, to make an agreement to keep mum unilaterally was never contemplated. I don't think any language that I said in there ever suggests it other than as Mr. Roberts spins it.

In 30 years of practice, there either is or is not confidentiality. Partial confidentiality, unilateral confidentiality is a direct contradiction in terms as I understand the word "confidential" in the English language, and we cannot agree to it. We did not agree to it.

THE COURT: Well, it seems to me that your argument, at least in part, is for partial confidentiality, because you're saying that the unredacted personnel files were under seal and therefore are subject to either

confidentiality or protection of the Court. And even if you had an agreement that there was no mutual confidentiality, I would think that those items would still remain subject to seal.

MR. ELLIS: Well, Your Honor, they were the subject of the Court orders. However, with complete impunity, counsel has said, too bad; I did it before the Court order, which we have no way of disproving, and therefore he uses whatever he chooses, including ones that were identified specifically by Bates numbers as being sealed. So we have no reason to believe that, even in the mutual confidentiality agreement, at this point that it would be adhered to by the plaintiff.

here. We were willing on April 19th, with the assumption that the case, all the documents in it were going to be sealed, all done, everybody's confidential; it's over. That's not a problem. What Mr. Roberts proposes and the language that he proposes is a significant problem. It's a problem that I don't think we should be forced to bear, and we're going to have to do whatever is necessary not to be so handicapped as to have our information, including the financial information in the deposition of chief counsel, which, although the Court never ruled on, we did ask to be sealed and we asked Mr. Roberts to agree to be sealed. No

1 matter. It was gone, sent. 2 The simple fact is that we have no confidence 3 whatsoever or reason to maintain confidentiality, and all 4 of our outside counsel are going to have to deal with Jeffries documents throughout the course, because, no 5 matter who we see or where they come from, they will say we 6 7 got them before such and such an order. We know at least 8 two counsel in Arizona who already have these depositions, 9 at least two. 10 THE COURT: Depositions. But those were in the 11 court record. 12 MR. ELLIS: Your Honor, everything is in the 13 court record. All those videotapes are in the court record 14 as well. 15 MR. ROBERTS: Not by my choice. I asked they be 16 sealed in April. 17 MR. ELLIS: We asked that Mr. Cohen's deposition 18 be sealed, and you didn't want to do that. We moved the 19 Court, and the Court didn't do it. 20 MR. ROBERTS: I asked you to agree with me that 21 everything be sealed, and you said no. 22 MR. ELLIS: I'm not going to do it unilaterally, Judge, and neither is my client. We shouldn't be forced to 23 do so. 24 25 MR. ROBERTS: The evidence of that is patent.

When the jury came out, it was clear that one person could 1 decide whether this person, third party, could or couldn't 2 learn the terms. And Mr. Jeffries, consistent with the 3 unilateral confidentiality, said, yes, they can learn. 4 MR. ELLIS: It's also consistent with mutual 5 confidentiality that was at his election. If he elected to 6 be not mutually, you know, quiet to a jury, then that's 7 fine. But never did I suggest that we would keep silent 8 while he spoke and spread whatever he wanted around the 9 country. That's not fair. That's just not fair. 10 11 THE COURT: Well, I have offered you an option by which you can respond to whatever has been used from this 12 case by Mr. Roberts in any other case, not just you, but 13 DMS's counsel. It doesn't mention your name. It says --14 15 MR. ELLIS: It mentions my name specifically, 16 Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: It says: If Centre, its counsel, DMS or any expert retained by DMS or its counsel in the action would receive a subpoena, and "in the action" refers to some other action. MR. ELLIS: It refers to the Jeffries case, Judge. THE COURT: All right. Well, then you can solve that problem by adding some language that would protect your client and your client's counsel in other cases

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elsewhere.

I need to do some research, but here are your two options. I would order, subject to my research as to my authority, unilateral confidentiality with the escape valve to permit DMS or Centre Life or their counsel wherever they may be litigating the opportunity to have access to what is otherwise confidential and in the possession of the defendant in our case.

The other option is to set the matter for trial again and charge against Centre Life the costs of the first case and probably some sanction for failing to consummate the settlement in good faith. Because I think the fact that you did not mention or reserve the right to limit the plaintiff's options to full mutual confidentiality or no confidentiality left the door open.

MR. ELLIS: So page seven meant nothing as far as requiring that it be mutual?

THE COURT: Let me look again. As far as sealing the whole record in this case?

MR. ELLIS: The whole record. That's the ultimate confidentiality.

THE COURT: It's fine with us, or returning it.

It makes no difference to us. We would, of course, ask for the information Mr. Roberts found concerning us be sealed, and the same with regard to Mr. Jeffries. No problem.

1 MR. ELLIS: So there is the whole file sealed, no 2 problem. 3 THE COURT: Whole record in this case. 4 MR. ELLIS: Whole record, no problem. 5 THE COURT: And then, when Mr. Roberts moved to do that, you resisted. 6 7 MR. ELLIS: Your Honor, when Mr. Roberts moved to do that, we were having difficulties with the language of 8 the settlement the agreement. We couldn't very well. 9 MS. CALLOW: Actually, Bill, at that point we 10 hadn't received a proposed settlement agreement, and we 11 simply suggested to Mr. Roberts that that's part of the 12 settlement agreement; go ahead and send it to us and that 13 will be in there. Whatever sealing the case was going to 14 be part of the settlement agreement, and we hadn't received 15 a proposed settlement agreement at that point. 16 17 MR. ROBERTS: Your Honor, they're talking about a different issue. If you go a couple lines up as to what 18 Mr. Ellis wants to focus on, after you asked Mr. Ellis 19 20 about whether it's a confidentiality option at 21 Mr. Jeffries' election, I then say, Your Honor, the only thing I would add as an additional issue is that there is 22 an extraordinary amount of personal information in this 23 record. We may come to the Court with the request that it 24 be sealed, the actual record here, the 02-351, that it be 25

1 That's a different issue than Mr. Jeffries being sealed. able to share with someone at his choice, at his election, 2 what happened, the terms of the settlement. It's an 3 4 additional issue. And then Mr. Ellis, there is no agreement on it. 5 It's just: I would add that we may come to the Court with 6 such a request to seal the record. And that's what 7 Mr. Ellis' response was directed to. 8 9 The other problem that I see is the THE COURT: record in the case is not as far reaching as what would 10 normally be the confidentiality concerns of the parties. 11 There may be information in the hands of either side which 12 13 is not yet part of the record, which was never filed with 14 the Court, but still may have concerns about sensitive personal or corporate information. 15 I mean --16 MR. ELLIS: Any sensitive corporate information has already been disseminated, Your Honor, so it doesn't 17 18 matter. We're already dealing with it in other cases from 19 other lawyers. 20 MR. ROBERTS: So the record is clear, I have not given a document to anyone other than Mr. Kearney, ever. 21 22 MR. ELLIS: Who then gave the document to whoever he wanted and/or Mr. Jeffries. Whoever spread it around, 23 all we know is the Jeffries documents and the Jeffries 24 transcripts are out there.

1 MR. ROBERTS: I gave him public record documents. 2 MR. ELLIS: Well, you gave him personnel records 3 of people from DMS. 4 MR. ROBERTS: No. I shared with him over the 5 I used one in the deposition, and then I immediately said let's redact whatever information concerns 6 7 you. 8 MR. ELLIS: That's a little different, Your 9 Honor. When we challenged the use of those, quote, what we 10 thought were sealed documents in the Kearney case, Mr. Roberts told us he had given them to Mr. Kearney and 11 12 gotten them back from Mr. Kearney, and that's why they 13 weren't covered by the order, because he had done that 14 before the order went on. 15 MR. ROBERTS: I had given him information. 16 MR. ELLIS: If that's the case, that, you know, 17 as long as there's no order on, anything can go off, then 18 we might as well get the case out in the open and let it be 19 done, and then I'll sign any confidentiality the Court 20 wants. But we did in good faith maintain confidentiality 21 after April 19th. We didn't use the Jeffries material in 22 any other case. We didn't use the information or share the 23 information with anyone, contrary to the way we were 24 treated by the other side.

Now the Court is suggesting that that is the

proper way to do things, that we are bound and they are 1 2 not. There is nowhere in that entire transcript where it 3 is ever suggested or stated that Mr. Roberts had the concept that only we would be bound by confidentiality; he 4 and his other clients and Mr. Jeffries could spread 5 6 whatever they wanted anywhere they wanted around the 7 country. 8 We have now learned that that's what is going on. 9 We have no desire whatsoever to enter into a confidentiality agreement, and I respectfully disagree with 10 the Court that that position puts me in some kind of 11 sanctionable position or bad faith for not going through 12 13 with an agreement that we never made. 14 THE COURT: Well, there is nothing in the 15 transcripts where Mr. Roberts said, well, if you will do 16 that, I'll do the same; I'll hold it all in confidence. You're the one who said, more or less sua sponte, I 17 18 guarantee you we will keep these matters confidential. 19 MS. CALLOW: Respectfully, Your Honor, that had 20 to do with the videotape specifically. 21 THE COURT: I don't see that. 22 MR. ROBERTS: Multiple references. 23 MR. ELLIS: Your Honor, if you read the entire transcript, I can't tell you how many times I said there is 24 25 only so much I can do today for the plaintiff to try and

get this resolved, but at no time in that entire record was 1 it ever suggested, ever suggested, that this was to be 2 unilateral. Nowhere was it every suggested it was 3 unilateral. And in 30 years of practice, I have never seen 4 a suggestion that there be unilateral confidentiality, 5 because the concept doesn't make any sense. 6 7 THE COURT: Apparently, it does. 8 MR. ELLIS: Not to me, it doesn't. MR. ROBERTS: The evidence of the disclosure to the jury directly contradicts Mr. Ellis' argument. MS. CALLOW: It could also be argued that evidence of disclosure to the jury was: Is this confidential or not? No, it is not; therefore, the jury can find out. MR. ELLIS: We can interpret this any way we want, but the simple fact is apparently we didn't have an agreement, and I thought that we did. THE COURT: Well, that's fine if you want to try this case. You understand the peril, and you understand that the cost of the trial will be assessed -- the aborted trial would be assessed against your client, and I will consider sanctions. And I'm going to look at the extent to which I have authority to simply impose what I perceive to have been the agreement between the parties. I know that I have

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1 the right to interpret what's on the record, as I understand it, and impose it on the parties. I think the 2 3 record is pretty clear. 4 MR. ELLIS: Can I ask the Court if at the time on April 19th this Court assumed this was going to be one way 5 6 confidential? 7 THE COURT: I didn't assume either way. I 8 thought it was entirely at Mr. Jeffries' option. 9 MR. ELLIS: As to whether or not it was 10 confidential or as to some crafted version of 11 confidentiality that defies the definition? 12 THE COURT: From full mutual confidentiality to 13 no confidentiality and everything along the spectrum. 14 MR. ELLIS: Then I'm the one who misunderstood 15 apparently, Your Honor, because I have never seen that 16 before. 17 THE COURT: Well, I can understand what you're 18 saying. But I also think that, if the defendant has the 19 right to secure whatever it needs to defend itself here or elsewhere from the record in this case, that that is a fair 20 21 resolution of the situation. 22 MR. ELLIS: So that we may go further, Your 23 Honor, I'll have to discuss, obviously, with my client what 24 election we make on this. So that I can properly discuss this with my client, my understanding is that, if the Court 25

is of a mind to order unilateral confidentiality, that only 1 my client cannot talk about the case, that the plaintiff 2 can spread whatever he wants anywhere he wants in the 3 country, that only when it is used or mentioned in another 4 case are we permitted to divulge information about the 5 Jeffries case. Is that correct? 6 7 THE COURT: That's pretty much correct. 8 MR. ELLIS: And we can divulge whatever is necessary to respond to whatever is used in the Jeffries 9 10 case in any other case. 11 THE COURT: Yes. 12 MR. ELLIS: All right. My understanding is 13 further, Your Honor, that you were going to adopt the language that Mr. Roberts put in where my litigation file 15 is given to him. THE COURT: Help me out here. I didn't read it as requiring that, but show me the language. MR. ELLIS: I'll be glad to help you out, Your His language specifically is at the end of the portion here that one copy only -- this is top of the page 13 of 13. One copy only of all the information Centre determines is necessary for maintenance in a, quote, Jeffries claims file, end quote, shall be maintained in the possession and the control of DMS general counsel -- just as an aside, he is not the records custodian of the claims

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file -- for as long as DMS shall serve Centre or Centre's 1 third-party administrator. Any additional copies shall be 2 returned to Mr. Jeffries' counsel, attorney Michael 3 Roberts, forthwith with a sworn certification of William R. 4 Ellis and Andrew Cohen that no additional copies of any 5 information relating to Mr. Jeffries are maintained at the 6 offices of Wood & Lamping, including electronically stored 7 8 information, or at DMS. 9 Now that is telling me to dispose of my claims 10 file and give it to Mr. Roberts. I wouldn't do that, 11 Judge. 12 THE COURT: I don't read that as requiring you to 13 give up any of your work product. 14 MR. ELLIS: Your Honor, that would be material 15 concerning Mr. Jeffries. 16 THE COURT: Okay. Well, I think it should be modified to make clear that your work product, your 17 18 personal litigation file should not be surrendered. I'm sure, I trust that Mr. Roberts did not intend that. 19 20 MR. ROBERTS: The language tracks what I 21 understood the agreement to be. There was a 45-minute 22 discussion of the concern about state regulators; otherwise, we could have everything. So it tracks that. 23 24 But I was given no opportunity to dialogue with Mr. Ellis about it, because he struck the whole thing and wouldn't 25

talk to me about it. I will be happy to talk to him about 1 2 that and any concerns he has. 3 THE COURT: No, I would not expect you to turn 4 over your file to him. 5 MR. ELLIS: Well, Your Honor, I didn't expect to have unilateral confidentiality either, but I have to make 6 7 sure we're on the record or very clear at this point that I'm not giving up my litigation case file nor any of my 8 e-mails with my clients nor any of my e-mails concerning 9 10 this case, nor any electronic data that I have stored on my 11 computer, nor any of the exhibits and so forth that we 12 generated for this case. 13 MR. ROBERTS: Are e-mails exchanged with a lawyer 14 representing a third party something he can maintain and 15 not provide to me? 16 THE COURT: I'm not entirely sure I follow the 17 question. 18 MR. ROBERTS: Let's assume that Mr. Ellis has 19 engaged in e-mail correspondence with an attorney 20 representing Prudential Insurance Company, a different 21 Are those things that don't need to be returned? 22 THE COURT: I think they're part of Mr. Jeffries' 23 litigation file, his work product, and he would be --24 MR. ROBERTS: What if they're evidence of some 25 disclosure or breach of confidence?

1 THE COURT: Well, I don't think that's before the 2 Court right now. 3 MR. ROBERTS: It's not right now. THE COURT: It may be in some other case at some 4 5 other time, but that's a different issue. 6 And I understand that there may be things in your file that can't be easily separated from your own notes and 7 thought processes. I think there should be some agreement 8 9 between the parties that you will secure the matters and 10 the materials that you have related to this case. 11 MR. ELLIS: Your Honor, I had no problem with that on April 19th, and, if it was mutual, I would have no 12 13 problem with it today. 14 THE COURT: Well, I understand your position. 15 MS. CALLOW: Your Honor, I just had one other thought based on Mr. Roberts' comments to you that I'm not 16 17 sure how we take care of. But if Mr. Jeffries and 18 Mr. Roberts can disseminate information regarding this case, but if there is an obligation on DMS not to 19 disseminate that information and information is in fact 20 21 disseminated, for example, through other clients that the Jeffries themselves did not authorize or disseminate, but 22 then it's charged back that possibly DMS disseminated it, 23 24 how do we handle that in the settlement agreement? Because I don't think that's addressed here. 25

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For example, third party dissemination, Mr. Roberts has stated that, if a document is out there, it's public record; it's in the public. DMS obviously can't disseminate, but anybody else can once it's out There are concerns that, if Mr. Roberts is making accusations that we have already disseminated information, which we haven't, that that might be an ongoing problem. MR. ROBERTS: I would reassert my request that the record be sealed right now, ask you to agree to that. And as far as the other issue goes, it's an evidentiary issue. You think I have breached the agreement; I think you have. It's an evidentiary issue about where the document came from. THE COURT: I tend to agree. My crystal ball is foggy this morning, and I don't know what's going to happen in other cases in other jurisdictions. MS. CALLOW: Right. Which is why I think we all wanted a resolution to end this case. And it sounds like what we're going down is the path of more litigation. MR. ROBERTS: Let's seal the record right now. MR. ELLIS: As soon we have an agreement, Your Honor, I think we can do that. THE COURT: All right. Well, as I said, I'm going to review my options. If you want to submit some briefs on that point, you can.

1 Thank you, Judge. I think we will. MR. ELLIS: 2 THE COURT: As I said, what I'm contemplating is, if I don't have the authority for some reason, after I have 3 given this some more thought and better research, then the 4 only other option is to set it for trial again and assess 5 the costs against one side or the other. And I can tell 6

you now it would be the defense. And there may be sanctions, and I'm thinking of sanctions in the nature of 8

ten percent interest on the unpaid settlement amount for

the period during which no settlement agreement language

11 was agreed between the parties, and that will be a

substantial amount, ten percent for six months on two

13 million dollars.

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MR. ELLIS: Well, let's consider a couple things there, Your Honor. First of all, obviously, that sanction will be improper if a defense verdict is rendered in the case ultimately.

THE COURT: Not necessarily.

MR. ELLIS: Okay. Secondly, the reason that it has taken six months, if the Court follows the time line that we presented with regard to the settlement agreement, there has not been delay on the part of DMS in trying to get this resolved. We waited a month for the first draft. We sent back interlineages 12 days after Mr. Jeffries had made an election as to how he wanted the money, and then we

waited two-and-a-half months for a return from Mr. Roberts 1 as to what he didn't like about what we had sent him, if 2 anything. So the delay was not on our part. We responded 3 promptly and as quickly as possible each time. Mr. Roberts 4 begins his letter saying it's been six months. What he 5 doesn't say is that we responded promptly every time we got 6 7 a draft. 8 THE COURT: Well, think about that as a starting 9 point, and then we'll talk about it. 10 MR. ELLIS: I understand Your Honor wants this to 11 be resolved. 12 THE COURT: I do. 13 MR. ELLIS: I think we would like to see this 14 resolved as well. 15 For the record, Your Honor, I think that the imposition of costs and sanctions, because apparently the 16 17 Court thinks I'm the only one that misunderstood what was 18 being said about confidentiality, I think is obviously a matter my client's going to have to consider but strikes me 19 20 personally as being somewhat unfair. 21 THE COURT: Well, let me just tell you why I'm 22 thinking that, preliminary thoughts on that subject. 23 look the at proposed settlement agreement. I see 24 substantial amounts of red lining with no apparent 25 explanation of why, and, unless I'm missing the point here,

I'm hearing, I believe, from the plaintiff that there was no explanation forthcoming of why this was all red lined. And things simply drifted after that. And there was ambiguous but apparently peremptory language from the defense that said this is the final version, which has a sort of take-it-or-leave tone to it, to my ear. Now, maybe that is not what was intended, but that's the way I have a tendency to hear it.

When somebody tells me this is the final version, that sounds to me this is our final offer. Take it or leave it. And if you don't respond and soften that position and engage in dialogue, then that seems to reinforce that impression.

MR. ELLIS: Your Honor, I don't know when I didn't respond to Mr. Roberts. In fact, subsequent to that, quote, final version, there is an e-mail in which he said I'm glad to see that we can still work on the tax issue. And with regard to the confidentiality, I expressed to him a number of times our concerns with the unilateral nature of it. Mr. Cohen expressed to him in his voice mail and e-mail that he has concerns about unilateral confidentiality because he never heard of it. If you read Mr. Cohen's voice mail, he says that's something that, you know, we have to talk about.

MR. ROBERTS: The voice mail predated by two or

three months the e-mail from Mr. Ellis which said this is the final version.

MR. ELLIS: In any event, I had discussed with Mike, he wanted to know about the reasons for the interlineages. I told him what we could not do, for example, on the tax issue. I told him in our telephone discussions that we could not sign off and say that Mr. Jeffries paid for his premiums with post-tax dollars. We don't know that. We didn't know that for a fact. Mike said, well, you investigated it for four months. But we didn't get the information from the bank, no matter how hard we tried, to confirm it one way or in other. And we can't take a position that we can't back up should we ever be questioned about it. So, I said you're asking us to say more than we can say. It's that simple.

Mr. Cohen and his financial advisor are hopefully working out language that will satisfy her concerns about taxes and not make us extend and say something we can't say. Same thing with all the confidentiality provisions, they have been overreaching, as is this one demanding my file. And, you know, and the unilateral nature of it just frankly threw me for a loop. I have never heard of such a thing where one side can say anything to anybody in the country they want and the other said remains mute. It doesn't even fit within the definition of the word

"confidential." Confidential by it's own definition 1 requires that nobody says anything. Now, if I'm using the 2 wrong language here, I guess that's my fault, but that's 3 what that word has always meant to me. 4 5 And I will be happy to brief the issue for the 6 I don't think there is a case in the country where Court. 7 unilateral confidentiality has ever been expressed, adopted ordered or even agreed to, because I think the terms are 8 9 mutually exclusive. 10 THE COURT: Well, I respectfully disagree, but 11 let's have a schedule on this. I think blind briefs two 12 weeks, and I'll just rule. I'll issue my order, and that 13 will be it. 14 MR. ELLIS: In the meantime, I should discuss with my client whether they want to go forward. Well, we 15 don't know actually how to make that decision yet, because 16 17 we don't know what the Court's going to rule. 18 10/22, close of business. THE COURT: 19 MR. ROBERTS: That's fine, Your Honor. 20 MR. ELLIS: Close of business is five o'clock, 21 Your Honor? 22 THE COURT: Yes. Close of our physical, not 23 electronic, doors. 24 MR. ELLIS: Well, I asked for a specific reason, 25 Your Honor.

1 I know, I know. It lost it's meaning THE COURT: in the new world order. If you can resolve this between 2 the two of you or between yourselves and Mr. Cohen and the 3 financial person between now and then and save yourselves 4 time and effort, that's fine. Otherwise, I'm going to do 5 6 something autocratic about it. 7 MR. ELLIS: Yes, ma'am. 8 THE COURT: You put me in the position where I 9 have to. 10 MR. ELLIS: Your Honor, believe me, I didn't want 11 the Court in this position, nor did I ever dream that this 12 was a potential. But I don't know what to do when someone can use whatever he chooses to use in any other case, 13 whether it's sealed, confidential or otherwise and then 14 15 expect us to remain mute about it. 16 THE COURT: Well --17 MR. ELLIS: It's a difficult situation for my 18 client to be in. 19 THE COURT: Maybe you can narrow the 20 confidentiality by agreement to Mr. Jeffries personal 21 information, medical information, whatever. 22 MR. ROBERTS: I have offered to talk about --23 MR. ELLIS: Your Honor, I never would disseminate medical information in any event. It would be a violation. 24 MR. ROBERTS: I have offered to talk about mutual 25

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      confidentiality since I got the final version. It's gone
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      nowhere.
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                THE COURT: I can't help but think, with two
      brilliant legal minds on both sides that you can't
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      fabricate.
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                MR. ROBERTS: I only have one on my side.
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                THE COURT: They have two.
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                MR. ELLIS:
                            They have --
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                MR. ROBERTS: They have two.
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               THE COURT: Construct a resolution of this
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     problem.
               It's not insoluble.
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               MR. ELLIS: We have to make the effort, Your
13
     Honor.
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               THE COURT: Well, why don't you do it? You can
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     make it as detailed, as fine tuned, as unique, as you
     choose. You can do that by agreement, and, unless it's the
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     most peculiar arrangement I have ever seen, I'm sure, I
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     will adopt it and sign off on it.
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               MR. ELLIS: Do I understand from the current
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     status of things, Your Honor, so that I know if other
     information is divulged, that, as of now there is no
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     confidentiality agreement until we come to one, and that,
     whatever is divulged at this point to whatever lawyers
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     around the country is tough luck?
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               MR. ROBERTS:
                             No. I'll represent this, that we
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1 settled the case on April 19h based on a representation 2 that you would maintain confidence from that moment 3 And I expect that to continue. 4 MR. ELLIS: I settled it with the same expectation that you would be confidential. 5 6 MR. ROBERTS: Well, you told me on the record 7 that you would guarantee from that day forward it would be confidential, not just the videotapes, everything. I 8 9 wasn't just concerned about the videotapes. 10 I will represent that I have shared information 11 with Mr. Kearney, and that's it. I haven't given documents 12 to anybody, and I don't intend to. 13 MR. ELLIS: In which case Mr. Kearney is very 14 well connected with plaintiffs' counsel around the country. MR. ROBERTS: Mr. Kearney is not the only 15 individual. First of all, that lawyer from Arizona you saw 16 17 has collected documents from many cases from many 18 jurisdictions. He's done research. Mr. Kearney isn't the 19 only person that had access to that. The entire world has 20 access to the record right now. 21 I again ask you, let's seal it. 22 MR. ELLIS: I'm sorry. I thought you told me 23 that you spoke with Mr. Kearney about it on the phone but didn't give it to him. Now, you're telling me Mr. Kearney 24 25 got it and sent it.

1	THE COURT: You're homogenizing the arguments
2	over the personnel files and the depositions, and I
3	understand the distinction, and I don't know that it's
4	fruitful to revisit it for the fourth or so time. But I
5	expect the defendant to hold the information that it's
6	acquired during the course of this case confidential.
7	Plaintiff has essentially recommended sort of a status quo
8	for at least the next couple of weeks. Is that a fair
9	statement?
10	MR. ROBERTS: We can maintain everything in
11	confidence for the next until further order of the Court
12	or further instruction from the Court.
13	THE COURT: All right.
14	MR. ELLIS: Can we have the same agreement that
15	counsel will advise Mr. Kearney to do the same with regard
16	to the Jeffries material? It's his client.
17	MR. ROBERTS: I will instruct Mr. Kearney to not
18	share any Jeffries information with anyone.
19	THE COURT: Okay.
20	MR. ELLIS: That will do for the moment, Your
21	Honor.
22	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
23	CONFERENCE CONCLUDED AT 10:35 A.M.
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CERTIFICATE I, Betty J. Schwab, the undersigned, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter. Official Reporter